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Virginia Tech Shootings: Crisis Magnifies the Significance of Small Weaknesses

By Bruce T. Blythe

The administration of Virginia Tech is widely under attack for allegedly not responding appropriately in the aftermath of the mass shootings on campus. They did have some ingredients for crisis response in place, such as a published protocol for crisis notification and lockdown procedures. However, these rudimentary measures are only serving as fodder for critics of the administration’s inadequate response of not following their own crisis procedures.

Clearly, Virginia Tech was not prepared for a crisis of this magnitude. Many seemingly small insignificant weaknesses in their crisis preparedness suddenly have been magnified into the worldwide spotlight. Administrators are now finding themselves on the defensive and appear not to be in control of their own crisis. So, what were the steps that Virginia Tech should have taken? What should they do now to gain control of their crisis?

Crisis Containment: The first step of any crisis leader is to take immediate actions to contain the crisis and anticipate how it could escalate in severity. In working with executives in Strategic Crisis Leadership, I continue to ask two important questions related to the immediate aftermath of an unexpected, high-consequence crisis: (1) How can this crisis escalate in severity; and (2) What needs to be done to contain the crisis to prevent further damage?

Once the initial shooting occurred on Virginia Tech’s campus, the administration needed to look beyond the obvious crisis and emergency response issues. It is the job of a good crisis leader to anticipate what could go wrong next. Crisis containment and response is active. As we know from experience, over response during the uncertain early aftermath is better than under response.

Once it has been confirmed that the emergency responders are doing their jobs, it is the job of the crisis leader to step back and anticipate what the crisis is beyond the obvious, what could potentially occur to make this situation worse, and what needs to start and stop immediately to minimize further damage.

Crisis Leadership: Obviously, this crisis was not on the leader’s to-do list for the day. This is not daily leadership. It is leadership that is highly visible, with high consequences, and to be executed with insufficient time and information.

One strategy to increase effectiveness of the leader who is unexpectedly under fire is to write it down. List out the facts (verified and unverified), what are the concerns and issues that can be anticipated, and what needs to be done to address these issues. Research has shown that writing during crises increases clarity and improves decision-making.

If we analyze the response of Virginia Tech administrators, we can readily see miscalculations that lead to escalating an already horrible situation.

Defining Decisions: The following “defining decisions” were made by Virginia Tech crisis leaders during the crisis containment phase that possibly allowed this situation to go from a two person killing to the deadliest mass shooting in U.S. history.

  1. Defining Decision #1: There is no need to immediately notify everyone on campus.

    The president of the University rationalized that people were in transit and couldn’t be reached. They assumed that it was an isolated “domestic” situation and the gunman had left the campus.

    With a double homicide on campus, uncertain motive and a gunman on the loose, it would certainly pass the “reasonable person test” to immediately notify everyone to stay out of harm’s way and to be on the lookout for anyone fitting any known description of the shooter.

    The excuse that people couldn’t be notified is not plausible. Crisis prepared organizations are equipping themselves with immediate notification tools that could have notified everyone in the entire school via phone and email simultaneously within a matter or seconds. This points to a lack of crisis preparedness, before the crisis occurred. In the absence of a technological solution an emergency notification phone tree could have been enlisted. Paul Revere was able to warn people that the “British were coming”, even without phones. The excuse that people were in transit was an inadequate rationale not to notify students and faculty who were potentially in harm’s way. The university needed to show a best faith effort to notify everyone immediately. An email blitz two hours after the first shooting was clearly an anemic and untimely attempt at emergency notification.

  2. Defining Decision #2: There is no need for lockdown of the entire campus. O.K., imagine that you are the leader in charge of this unexpected incident. You have a double homicide and the perpetrator at large. Would it make sense to lock down the school? A risk-reward analysis would clearly lead a rational thinking person to error on the side of caution. Lock the school down . . . now!! The likely downside would be a disrupted class schedule for the morning. The reward could be protecting the lives of students and faculty. There is a possibility that the gunman was already in a building where a lockdown occurred. But, with the inherent vigilance that a lockdown induces, it is likely that someone would have spotted the gunman and reported his location during the two hours that transpired between shootings.

  3. Defining Decision #3: There is no need for campus wide security escalation and search.

    We now know that the school had a surveillance camera system that was inadequate for identifying the shooter after the first homicides. Would it make sense to a reasonable person that security should be highly increased with a campus murderer on the loose? Call the local police for assistance. Call the Governor to provide National Guard units. Job number one of crisis containment was to get control of the security of the campus to assure the safety of everyone at Virginia Tech.

    Strategic Crisis Leadership Phase: Once the incident was over and the shooter had been confirmed dead, Virginia Tech administrators entered the Strategic Crisis Leadership phase of the crisis.

  4. Defining Decision #4: Hold a press conference, without adequate preplanned messaging.

    It was apparent that sufficient preplanned messaging did not precede the initial press conference before being aired throughout the nation and world. University representatives discussed flawed assumptions that made little logical sense. They vaguely stated that they had “reason to believe” the first shooting was domestic in nature and the gunman had fled the campus. They gave no reasonable rationale for those “beliefs.” They stated that they were pursuing a person of interest following the first shooting, but stopped looking after the second and more horrible second round of shootings. Yet, they stated they were not sure if the two shootings were related. It made no logical sense to stop looking for the first person of interest if they were not sure the two were related. The public was beginning to suspect an administration and crisis response that is was out of control.

Now what? What should the university do now, even though damage to their reputation is harmed from the shooting and additionally from the inadequate crisis response? I fall back on the “Be, Know, Do” model that I borrowed from the U.S. Army in developing a model for Strategic Crisis Leadership.

Be: What kind of persons should Virginia Tech administrators be during the crisis aftermath? We know from research at the Center for Risk Communications that the single most important ingredient of crisis messaging in “high concern” situations is the effective expression and demonstration of “caring.” They need to demonstrate openly in every way they can that they truly care at a heartfelt level.

Dick Hyde, Hill & Knowlton’s crisis public relations sage of many decades, reports that the police officer was unable to effectively show his heartfelt caring in the press conference. We all know that internally he must have cared deeply. But, in crisis management, “caring” is not a feeling. Caring, instead, is a set of overt behaviors and messages that lead impacted stakeholders to believe that you care about their needs and concerns. It is critical that leaders and spokespersons get in touch with their deepest sense of caring and compassion and figure out a way to convey it in a credible manner. Rudy Giuliani did it following 9/11. These administrators owe it to the school’s reputation to get immediate coaching in how best to demonstrate personal caring.

Know: It is critical that administrators identify a “vision” for appropriate crisis resolution. They need to identify the crisis beyond the obvious. The obvious crisis is the harm done to students, faculty and families as a result of the shooting. The less obvious crisis that needs to be managed is the damaged reputation and brand of the school. This vision must be condensed into no more than three key messages, with each message containing no more than a dozen words. We again know from research at the Center for Risk Communications that people in high concern situations don’t hear, understand or retain messages that go beyond three key concepts, or involve more than a dozen words each to express. The key is for Virginia Tech to share their well-thought-out vision repeatedly and then effectively execute their plan.

Do: No crisis management is any better than its communication. This involves effective two-way communication to and from all impacted stakeholders. Messaging needs to be tailored to address the needs and concerns of each stakeholder group. Beyond crisis counseling, administrators need to allow people to feel heard and understood. Town hall meetings are not recommended, since they could quickly explode out of hand. Instead, private focus and feedback groups could be held with stakeholders such as students, parents, faculty and families. Administrators need to find as many appropriate ways as possible to give and receive timely and high-quality communications.

A multidisciplinary crisis recovery committee should be started immediately with both internal representatives and external crisis specialists. Administrators need feedback and best ideas for how to respond from this point forward. Re-entry into a new normal should be a purposeful and well-thought-out process. A crisis recovery committee could help guide that process.

Jonathan Bernstein, nationally known crisis Public Relations specialist, summed it up in saying that the response of Virginia Tech administrators appeared to show a basic lack of crisis preparedness. The incident was predictable, in that shootings have occurred previously in several school settings. However, crisis response appeared to be inadequately planned, trained and rehearsed. As a result, administrators are now on the defensive. Lesson learned? Adequate crisis preparedness is the single greatest correlate with success crisis response. Even now, as they should have done from the beginning, crisis responders at Virginia Tech should assume the worst, respond accordingly and hope for the best.

Bruce Blythe

About the Author

Bruce T. Blythe is the CEO of Atlanta-based Crisis Management International; a crisis consulting firm that assists corporations, governments and schools prepare for and respond to crises of all types. He is the author of Blindsided: A Manager's Guide to Catastrophic Incidents in the Workplace (Penguin-Putnam, 2002). www.cmiatl.com


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